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PERSPECTIVE
Jurisdiction and the Court of International
Trade: Remarks of the Honorable
Gregory W. Carman at the Conference
on International Business Practice
Presented by the Center for Dispute
Resolution on February 27-28, 1992
The Honorable Gregory W. Carman*
I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach the third millennium, prefaced by the 20th century,
we recognize as an axiom that what has gone before will affect what will
happen later. Although we have lived our lives in the 20th century, it is
not so easy to comprehend fully the significance of all the events of our
time. Our "current events" are certainly a continuance of the past and,
without doubt, a portent of the future. We have been astonished by nu-
clear power, air and outer space travel, television, computers, the genetic
code, miracle drugs, and countless other advances. Social change, envi-
ronmental awareness, high-speed general communication and electronic
transfers have all made us feel we are living in an even smaller world.
While it is impossible to predict how all of the events of the 20th century
* Judge, United States Court of International Trade.
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will affect our lives in the 21st, it is possible to forecast that international
trade will be even more significant tomorrow than today.
The United States and the other countries of the world will continue
to develop rules and laws governing their relationships in international
commercial matters as the years ensue. As part of that agenda, lawyers
and members of the international trading community should be familiar
with the dispute resolution provisions of the United States Court of In-
ternational Trade and some of the procedural and substantive problems
of the Court. The Court's function is to judicially review disputes under
the customs and trade laws of the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations' and "to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises. '  It requires all such duties, imposts and
excises to be uniform throughout the United States.3 In 1789, the First
Congress of the United States passed the Tariff Act of July 4, 1789 "[flor
the support of government, for the discharge of the debts of the United
States, and the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that du-
ties be laid on goods, wares and merchandises imported."4 That first
tariff legislation has been followed by about 200 statutes pertaining to the
customs and international trade laws of the United States.5 Many were
merely amendments to previous tariff acts-others were policy-making in
character.6
In 1890, a Board of General Appraisers, consisting of nine members,
was established under the general supervision of the Secretary of the
Treasury to exercise "supervision over appraisements and classifications,
for duty, of imported merchandise as may be needful to secure lawful
and uniform appraisements and classifications at the several ports."7
The Board of General Appraisers was renamed the United States Cus-
toms Court, an Article I court, in 1926, although its powers and jurisdic-
tion remained similar to those of the old Board.' In 1956, the Customs
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 Id. art. I, § 8, ci. 1.
3 Id. (emphasis added).
4 Tariff Act of July 4, 1789, 1 Stat. 24 (1789).
5 Hon. Edward D. Re, Litigation Before the United States Court of International Trade, 19
U.S.C.A. XI, XII (West Supp. 1992).
6 rd.
7 Customs Administrative Act, Ch. 407, §§ 12-13, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (1890).




Court was declared to be established under Article III of the United
States Constitution. 9
In 1970, Congress, recognizing that the procedures and jurisdiction
of the Court were in need of significant revision, made sweeping proce-
dural reforms, but left substantive issues regarding the jurisdiction and
powers of the Court unresolved. 10 The 1979 Trade Agreements Act
granted the Customs Court new jurisdiction, particularly with regard to
antidumping and countervailing duty cases and, for the first time, au-
thorized the Court to grant injunctive relief in customs cases.11 In 1980
the Court was empowered to issue money judgments and provide equita-
ble relief.12
Nevertheless, it was recognized by Congress that the primary statute
governing the United States Customs Court had not kept pace with the
increasing complexities of international trade litigation.13 The result was
a jigsaw puzzle with so many missing pieces that it was difficult for eve-
ryone except the closest observer to discover what the completed puzzle
was intended to show. 14
The earlier jurisdictional statutes of the Customs Court were con-
strued to facilitate challenges to classification and valuation of merchan-
dise determinations.15 Although multilateral negotiations led to a
diminution in tariff duties and, consequently, to a lessening of impor-
tance, at least from a revenue point of view, of classification and valua-
tion cases, antidumping and countervailing duty statutes assumed gieater
importance. 16
Many lawsuits involving international trade issues were commenced
in the federal district court instead of the United States Customs Court
because it was difficult to determine in advance whether a particular case
fell within the jurisdictional scope of the Customs Court and because
powers of the Customs Court were limited.17 Most district courts re-
fused to entertain such suits, citing the constitutional mandate requiring
that duties be uniform throughout the United States, thus endeavoring to
preserve the congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the United
States Customs Court for judicial review of all matters relating to im-
9 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1988).




14 Id. at 18-19.
15 Id. at 19.
16 Id.
17 Id., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3730-31.
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ports.1 8 The result was inconsistent judicial decisions, with litigants pro-
ceeding with caution when choosing a forum for judicial review.19
Furthermore, the type of relief available was greatly dependent upon the
plaintiff's ability to persuade a court that it possessed jurisdiction over a
particular case.2' Some individuals obtained relief, while others, who by
chance selected the wrong forum, were denied relief.21
With the growth in international trade suits in the federal district
court, dismissals for lack ofjursdiction increased.22 The House Legisla-
tive Committee Report stated that "Congress is greatly concerned that
numerous individuals and firms, who believe they possess real grievances,
are expending significant amounts of time and money in a futile effort to
obtain judicial review of the merits of their case."23 Recognizing these
problems, Congress passed the Customs Courts Act of 1980, which ex-
panded and clarified the jurisdiction of the United States Customs Court
from a substantive and remedial standpoint.2 4 The name of the Court
was changed from the United States Customs Court to the United States
Court of International Trade to reflect "more accurately.., the court's
clarified and expanded jurisdiction and its new judicial functions relating
to international trade."2 Senator Dennis DeConcini, the Senate sponsor
of the Customs Court Act of 1980, indicated that the law would "elimi-
nate the considerable jurisdictional confusion" that existed at the time
between the other federal courts and "increase the availability of judicial
review in the field of international trade in a manner which results in
uniformity without sacrificing the expeditious resolution of import-re-
lated disputes."26
The prophecy of Senator DeConcini will be examined in the follow-
ing remarks. It is important to note, however, that to date this prophecy
has not been fulfilled.
III. THE COURT
The Court of International Trade is the only national trial court in
the United States established under Article III of the Constitution. Arti-




22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 Id.
24 Re, Litigation Before the United States Court of International Trade, supra note 5, at XIII.
25 Committee Report, supra note 8, at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3732 (emphasis
added).
26 126 Cong. Rec. 27, 063 (1980).
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cle III provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may, from time to time, establish.2 7 The judges, both of the Supreme
Court and the inferior courts, hold their offices during good behavior and
receive compensation which shall not be diminished during their contin-
uance in office.28
The Court is authorized nine judges who are appointed by the Presi-
dent, with the advice and consent of the Senate.29 The judges, as with all
other Article III judges, may be designated and temporarily assigned by
the Chief Justice of the United States to perform judicial duties in any
United States Circuit Court of Appeals or any United States District
Court.30 The Court of International Trade possesses all the powers in
law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district court of the
United States. 31
IV. JURISDICTION
The Court's jurisdiction, which is civil in nature, includes civil suits
arising from numerous types of actions by agencies as the result of im-
port transactions.32 The Court's authority pertains to the classification
and valuation of merchandise,33 charging duties and fees on the importa-
tion of merchandise, the exclusion of merchandise from entry under pro-
visions of the customs laws, the liquidation of entries, the refusal to pay
drawback, and challenge to antidumping and countervailing duty
cases. 31 In addition, the Court has jurisdiction over actions to review the
denial, revocation, or suspension of a customs broker's license,35 determi-
nations concerning eligibility for trade adjustments under the Trade Act
of 1974,36 and penalty cases.37
27 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
28 Id.
29 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1988).
30 Id. § 293(a).
31 Id. § 1585.
32 Id. §§ 1581-1584.
33 Classification cases are concerned with the tariff schedules of the United States (TSUS) and
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), an international agreement system-
atizing the classification of goods and implementing the International Convention on Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System. 19 U.S.C. § 3001 (1988).
34 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1584 (1988).
35 Id. § 1581(g).
36 Id. § 1581(d).
37 Id. § 1582.
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V. RESIDUAL JURISDICTIONAL POBLEMS
If Congress had set out to create a jurisdictional gauntlet for liti-
gants, it is difficult to imagine how it could have designed a better system
than that which has resulted since the enactment of the Customs Courts
Act of 1980.
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade
was revised by 28 U.S.C. § 1581. Exclusive jurisdiction was conferred
upon the Court pertaining to the various civil actions which I have just
discussed.
First, the primary jurisdictional statute of the Court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581, as it has been interpreted by the Courts, presents a confusing and
costly jurisdictional maze which is seemingly designed to deny litigants
easy access to the Court of International Trade to resolve legitimate cus-
toms and international trade disputes. Litigants must slide exactly into a
glove of eight jurisdictional fingers, known as 28 U.S.C. § 158 1(a)-(h) or
they are out of court. The residual jurisdiction section 1581(i) can only
be used under exceptional circumstances. One example is where the ju-
risdictional fingers in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h) provide a manifestly inade-
quate remedy. In this situation, the Court may resort to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i).
Second, there continues to be considerable jurisdictional confusion
between the Court of International Trade and the federal district courts.
This confusion has impeded the availability of judicial review in the field
of international trade where the goals of national uniformity and expedi-
tious resolution of disputes, although worthy objectives, appear to be
evanescent.
VI. THE STATUTORY SCHEME IN THE COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h), the statute sets forth with specificity the
Court's exclusive jurisdiction over classification and valuation cases, an-
tidumping and countervailing duty determinations, review of administra-
tive decisions by the Secretary of Labor pertaining to the granting or
denial of eligibility of workers for adjustment assistance, decisions by the
Secretary of the Treasury denying, revoking, or suspending customs bro-
kers' licenses or permits, and other matters.
Today, it is essential for plaintiffs to recognize that if provisions for
relief can be found in the enumerated subsections (a)-(h), plaintiffs must




Court of International Trade will have jurisdiction to resolve the issues in
the case before seeking jurisdiction under § 1581(i).
It is important to examine the precise language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i), which provides as follows:
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Interna-
tional Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the excep-
tion set forth in subsection (j) of this section [which prohibits the
importation of various immoral articles], the Court of International Trade
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the
United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the
United States providing for -
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchan-
dise for reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public
health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters re-
ferred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections
(a)-(h) of this section.
This subsection shall not confer jurisdiction over an antidumping or
countervailing duty determination which is reviewable either by the Court
of International Trade under section 516A(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 or
by a binational panel under article 1904 of the United States-Canada Free-
Trade Agreement and section 516A(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
The interpretation that a plaintiff must first resort to the specific
provisions set forth in 1581(a)-(h) before looking to (i) was early ex-
pressed by our appellate court in 1982 in United States v. Uniroyal,
Inc..3s In Uniroyal, plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief on
account of the Customs Service's determination requiring certain mark-
ings on merchandise. The United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the predecessor court to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, held that the Court of International Trade did not
have jurisdiction to hear an importer's challenge to a Customs Service
ruling under 1581(i), because the importer could have filed a protest fol-
lowing the statutory scheme under 1581(a). The Court said that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under § 1581(i) is ex-
pressly 'in addition to the jurisdiction conferred ... by subsections (a)-
(h),' and the legislative history of § 1581 further evidences Congress' in-
tention that subsection (i) not be used generally to bypass administrative
review by meaningful protest. '39
38 687 F.2d 467, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
39 Id.
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In Miller & Co. v. United States,' an importer endeavored to chal-
lenge a countervailing duty order pertaining to pig iron from Brazil. The
Court of Appeals, affirming the Court of International Trade, held the
importer lacked standing to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of International Trade. Chief Judge Markey observed in part:
The jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade is set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1581. Subsections (a)-(h) give that Court exclusive jurisdiction
over specific types of civil actions. [Plaintiff) must establish standing under
subsection (i), a broad residual jurisdictional provision.
Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction
under another subsection of § 1581 is or could have been available, unless
the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inad-
equate. Where another remedy is or could have been available, the party
asserting § 1581(i) jurisdiction has the burden to show how that remedy
would be manifestly inadequate. 4 '
The manifestly inadequate element is a judicially-required prerequisite
that appears nowhere in the statutory terminology or the legislative
history.
Although Chief Judge Markey referred to 1581(i) as a broad
residualjurisdictionalprovision, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit has actually interpreted 1581(i) narrowly from a jurisdictional stand-
point.4' For example, in National Corngrowers the Court said in part:
[One cannot] ignore the precepts of subsection 1581 and [attempt] to
circumvent the Congressionally mandated process by immediately filing
suit .... The jurisdictional statute is set up to reflect existing law and not
to expand the Court of International Trade jurisdiction to the point of cre-
ating new causes of action not founded on other provisions of existing
law.43
This narrow implementation appears to have exacerbated the problem.
Congress endeavored to do away with the jigsaw puzzle approach per-
taining to arcane jurisdictional issues. The narrow interpretation given to
158 1(i) by the courts has contributed to the effect of requiring individuals
and firms that have real international trade and customs law grievances
to expend significant amounts of time and money in sometimes futile ef-
forts to obtain judicial review on the merits of the case. The House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary stated:
Subsection (i) is intended only to confer subject matter jurisdiction
40 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988).
41 Id. at 963 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
42 See, eg., Nat'l Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1988); American Air
Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937
(1984); Lowa Ltd. v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 441 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); United States v. Uniroyal, 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982).




upon the court, and not to create any new causes of action not founded on
other provisions of law.
The purpose of this broad jurisdictional grant is to eliminate the confu-
sion which currently exists as to the demarcation between the jurisdiction
of the district courts and the Court of International Trade. This provision
makes it clear that all suits of the type specified are properly commenced
only in the Court of International Trade. The Committee has included this
provision in the legislation to eliminate much of the difficulty experienced
by international trade litigants who in the past commenced suits in the dis-
trict courts only to have those suits dismissed for want of subject matter
jurisdiction. The grant of jurisdiction in subsection (i) will ensure that these
suits will be heard on their merits.4
Commentators have opined that the lack of a meaningful statutory
jurisdictional route, coupled with overly narrow jurisdictional interpreta-
tions as to the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade, has left
America with a Court that is approaching the 21st century with 19th
century jurisdiction.45 This statutory scheme in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade between the relationship of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h) and 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i) has resulted in limiting access by litigants to resolve le-
gitimate cases and controversies pertaining to customs and international
trade cases because (1) of the narrow interpretation by the courts of the
jurisdictional statute 28 U.S.C. § 1581 and (2) of the statutory scheme
itself.
VII. THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
OR THE DISTRIcT COURT?
Access to the Court of International Trade has been further limited
because litigants do not know whether they should sue in the Court of
International Trade or the district court to secure relief in customs and
international trade cases or controversies. A discussion of some of the
so-called "gray-market" trade cases exemplifies the dilemma confronting
litigants when they must decide in which forum to commence their ac-
tion. A "gray-market" good is a foreign-manufactured good bearing a
valid U. S. trademark, which is imported without the consent of the
United States trademark owner.
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States,6 the plaintiff-owner of the Vivitar
trademark sought an order directing the Customs Service to exclude
44 Committee Report, supra note 8, at 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3759.
45 Andrew P. Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction of 28 US. C 1581(i): A View from the Plain-
tiff's Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 793, 801 (1984); see Marilyn-Joy Heintz, Comment, The Residual
Jurisdiction Controversy of the United States Court of International Trade, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L.,
341, 355 (1990).
46 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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from entry any merchandise bearing the Vivitar trade name. The Court
observed that, while the district courts generally have jurisdiction over
trademark cases, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976), the Court of Interna-
tional Trade has jurisdiction generally over cases arising out of interna-
tional trade disputes. In determining whether the case should belong in
the district court or in the Court of International Trade, the Court indi-
cated it was necessary that the gravemen of the complaint be examined.
Because the relief sought related to regulations promulgated by Customs
and their administration and enforcement, the Court took jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(4).
In Olympus Corp. v. United States,4 7 an American subsidiary of a
foreign manufacturer of trademarked goods sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief declaring Customs regulations, which permitted importa-
tion of gray-market goods, invalid. The Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that the Court of International Trade had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the Tariff Act claim and found that the district court properly
asserted jurisdiction over the dispute. The Court determined that the
Customs regulations were valid.
In Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United
States,48 the Court held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear an
action for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Customs Ser-
vice regulations that were in conflict with the Tariff Act of 1930 and the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 under the grant of general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.49 The Court also specifically declined to follow the
holding in Vivitar, which conferred jurisdiction upon the Court of Inter-
national Trade. The Court, however, reversed the district court's hold-
ing that the Customs regulations were valid, by finding that Customs'
interpretation of the statutes did not meet the "sufficiently reasonable"
standard.
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.," Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority in a five-to-three decision, rejected the theory that Section 256
of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits importation into the United
States of any merchandise of foreign manufacture if the merchandise
bears a trade name, was an embargo. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a
regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury permitting importation of cer-
tain gray-market goods; and
47 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
48 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reversing 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984).
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
50 485 U.S. 176, 183 (1988).
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(2) the Court of International Trade did not have exclusive jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) which grants such jurisdiction over certain
suits involving embargoes or other suits involving quantitative restrictions
on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of
public health or safety.
The Court accepted the meaning of embargo adopted by Congress in
its statutory language to mean "a governmentally-imposed quantitative
restriction-of zero-on the importation of merchandise."'" Justice
Brennan indicated that the mere allowance of a private party to enforce
rights using government assistance was not an embargo.52
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connnor in his dissent, concluded that § 526 falls within the ordinary
meaning of the term embargo. 3 He buttressed his position not only with
lexicographic definitions but legislative history as well. Significantly, Jus-
tice Scalia pointed out that the Supreme Court was blurring jurisdic-
tional lines established by Congress. Justice Scalia stated:
"[w]hile the gray-market question is of greater immediate economic
importane ... the jurisdictional question, if decided incorrectly, may gen-
erate uncertainty and hence litigation into the indefinite future. In my
view, the Court's resolution of this question strains the plain language of
the statute, and blurs a clear jurisdictional line that Congress has
established.
The Court of International Trade's exclusive jurisdiction extends to
any civil action against the United States, its agencies or officers, "that
arises out of any law of the United States providing for ... embargoes or
other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise for rea-
sons other than the protection of the public health or safety." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)(3). The statute does not define "embargo," and there is no reason
to give it anything other than its ordinary meaning. An embargo is "a pro-
hibition imposed by law upon commerce either in general or in one or more
of its branches," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 738 (1981),
a "[g]overnment order prohibiting commercial trade with individuals or
businesses of other nations," Black's Law Dictionary 468 (5th ed. 1979), an
"[a]uthoritative stoppage of foreign commerce or of any special trade,"
Funk & Wagnalls New International Dictionary of the English Language
411 (1984).
The present lawsuit challenges a Customs Service regulation, ... that
implements § 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 ..... That statutory provi-
sion, which begins with the caption "(a) Importation prohibited," excludes
from the United States foreign-made merchandise bearing a trademark
owned and recorded by a United States citizen or corporation. Section
526(a) is, to borrow language from the Senate debate, "an embargo against
51 K Mart, 485 U.S. at 185.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 193-96.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:245(1992)
any foreign country shipping goods here where an American claims he has
a trade-mark upon them." 62 Cong. Rec. 11603 (1922) (remarks of Sen.
Kellogg) (emphasis added). Because this suit against the United States
arises out of a law providing for an embargo, I would hold that it is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.54
One commentator has pointed out that the confusion born of the
majority opinion in K Mart, that certain embargoes are not the
equivalent of import restrictions, will necessitate that all questions relat-
ing to § 1581(i) jurisdiction undergo a more intensive and possibly tor-
tured analysis in order to determine if a case is properly before the Court
of International Trade.55 It has been suggested further that the effect of
K Mart is the establishment of concurrent jurisdiction between the Court
of International Trade and the federal district courts, depending upon
how litigants frame the issues.5 6 Of course, this result is counter to the
exclusivity mandate that is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1581.
It would be a mistake to think that the dilemma facing litigants,
who do not know if they should sue in the Court of International Trade
or in the district court, is limited to gray-market or trademark cases.
In a recent case challenging a condition imposed by the Foreign-
Trade Zone Board, requiring foreign crude oil used as fuel for a refinery
in a foreign trade zone be made dutiable, the government argued the
district court did not have jurisdiction, and that exclusive jurisdiction
was in the Court of International Trade. The district court adopted the
view that, although 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) did not create any substantive
right governing exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of International
Trade, nevertheless, because the case involved an appeal of an adminis-
trative decision directly relating to tariffs on imported goods and the use
of revenue in that field, § 1581 should be applicable to the case regardless
of whether an actual tariff on foreign commerce was presently imposed.
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion without prejudice and at plaintiff's costs, finding that proper juris-
diction lies in the Court of International Trade.5
Plaintiff subsequently commenced an action in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade. In that subsequent action, the government moved to dis-
miss upon the ground that the Court of International Trade had no
subject matter jurisdiction and, further, no court has subject matter
54 Id. at 191-93.
55 Giovanni M. Cinelli, Jurisdictional Quagmire: The Implications ofK Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 16
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 39, 63 (1989).
56 Id.




What Congress specifically tried to correct and what appears to be a
type of jurisdictional ping-pong game continues to plague individuals and
firms. They must waste time and money as they pursue futile efforts to
obtain judicial review. Which court has jurisdiction, the Court of Inter-
national Trade or the district court? One commentator points out:
When considering jurisdictional issues, the CIT [Court of Interna-
tional Trade] should weigh the executive branch's disdain of judicial review,
and its interest in limiting the scope and availability of such review against
the needs of international trade litigants. The courts represent the main
defense available to citizens fighting the federal government. The failure to
find a home for international trade cases effectively immunizes the Customs
Service, the International Trade Administration, and the International
Trade Commission. It has been argued that the CIT's [Court of Interna-
tional Trade] failure to provide judicial review over international trade mat-
ters appears to invite unchecked arbitrary governmental action.
59
Even if one does not agree with these conclusions, the frustration
level of litigants is clearly on the rise.
The prediction of Justice Scalia, that "the jurisdictional question [re-
ferring to the K Mart case], f decided incorrectly, may generate uncer-
tainty and, hence, litigation into the indefinite future,"' seems to have an
eerie prescience.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Individuals and firms are required to expend an inordinate amount
of time and money to obtain judicial review. They are required to navi-
gate arcane jurisdictional passages. They waste time and resources fight-
ing over jurisdiction and often times they are denied the chance to be
heard on the merits of the case. These obstacles unnecessarily increase
cost and hurt the efforts of the United States to be competitive in the
international community.
The restricted statutory scheme of § 1581(a)-(h) and its relationship
to 158 1(i) should be re-examined. The blurred jurisdictional line referred
to by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in K Mart needs to be clearly
brought into focus before the hopeful prediction of Senator DeConcini to
"eliminate the considerable jurisdictional confusion" can be realized.
58 Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zone Bd., 790 F. Supp. 279 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992).
59 Heintz, supra note 45, at 374-75 (footnotes omitted).
60 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 192 (1988).
